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Abstract 
When there is no contingency between actions and outcomes, but outcomes occur 
frequently, people tend to judge that they have control over those outcomes, a 
phenomenon known as the outcome density (OD) effect.  Recent studies show that the 
OD effect depends on the duration of the temporal interval between action-outcome 
conjunctions, with longer intervals inducing stronger effects.  However, under some 
circumstances OD effect is reduced, for example when participants are mildly 
depressed.  We reasoned that Working Memory (WM) plays an important role in 
learning of context; with reduced WM capacity to process contextual information 
during intertrial intervals (ITIs) during contingency learning might lead to reduced 
OD effects (limited capacity hypothesis).  To test this, we used a novel dual-task 
procedure that increases the WM load during the ITIs of an operant (e.g., action-
outcome) contingency learning task to impact contextual learning.  We tested our 
hypotheses in groups of students with zero (Experiments 1, N= 34), and positive 
contingencies (Experiment 2, N= 34).  The findings indicated that WM load during 
the ITIs reduced the OD effects compared to no load conditions (Experiment 1 and 2).  
In Experiment 2, we observed reduced OD effects on action judgements under high 
load in zero and positive contingencies.  However, the participants’ judgements were 
still sensitive to the difference between zero and positive contingencies.  We discuss 
the implications of our findings for the effects of depression and context in 
contingency learning.  
 
Keywords: contingency learning; perceived control; working memory load; 
associative learning; depressive realism    
*Abstract
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Abstract 
When there is no contingency between actions and outcomes, but outcomes occur frequently, 
people tend to judge that they have control over those outcomes, a phenomenon known as the 
outcome density (OD) effect.  Recent studies show that the OD effect depends on the 
duration of the temporal interval between action-outcome conjunctions, with longer intervals 
inducing stronger effects.  However, under some circumstances OD effect is reduced, for 
example when participants are mildly depressed.  We reasoned that Working Memory (WM) 
plays an important role in learning of context; with reduced WM capacity to process 
contextual information during intertrial intervals (ITIs) during contingency learning might 
lead to reduced OD effects (limited capacity hypothesis).  To test this, we used a novel dual-
task procedure that increases the WM load during the ITIs of an operant (e.g., action-
outcome) contingency learning task to impact contextual learning.  We tested our hypotheses 
in groups of students with zero (Experiments 1, N= 34), and positive contingencies 
(Experiment 2, N= 34).  The findings indicated that WM load during the ITIs reduced the OD 
effects compared to no load conditions (Experiment 1 and 2).  In Experiment 2, we observed 
reduced OD effects on action judgements under high load in zero and positive contingencies.  
However, the participants’ judgements were still sensitive to the difference between zero and 
positive contingencies.  We discuss the implications of our findings for the effects of 
depression and context in contingency learning.  
 
Keywords: contingency learning; perceived control; working memory load; 
associative learning; depressive realism   
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THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON JUDGEMENTS 3 
The Effects of Cognitive Load during the Intertrial Intervals on Judgements of Control: The 
Role of Working Memory and Contextual Learning 
1. Introduction 
Perception of control over specific events is a subjective feeling that is thought to depend on 
how people perceive the objective action-outcome contingencies in the environment (Langer, 
1975, also see E. A. Skinner, 1996 for various terms and measures used to describe control).  
Experimental studies using contingency learning paradigms have shown that perception of 
moderate levels of control over events, even when statistically there is none, is related to 
mental healthiness, with extremely high and low levels of perceived control relating to 
psychopathology (Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1988; Metcalfe, Snellenberg, DeRosse, Balsam, 
& Malhotra, 2014; Reuven-Magril, Dar, & Liberman, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988).  
In this research, we test how changes in perceived control relate to the effects of 
cognitive load, which might prevent learning of important contextual information relevant to 
contingency learning.  This is relevant, as learning is believed to occur in a limited capacity 
device (Wagner, 1978, 1981; Pearce & Hall, 1980), and when cognitive capacity is reduced 
this might interfere with the learning of contextual information.  Thus, our analysis will focus 
on cognitive and behavioural processes such as attention and memory that might play a 
causal role in healthy and lower levels of perceived control (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & 
Shafran, 2004).  However, first, we will discuss how perception of control has been studied 
and the situations where individuals differ in their levels of perceived control. 
1.1. Operant contingency 
In operant contingency learning tasks, individuals learn the relations between their actions 
and the outcomes.  There are two versions of the operant learning paradigms: free-operant 
and discrete-trial procedures.  In free-operant procedures, the task is divided into time-bins, 
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THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON JUDGEMENTS 4 
and the participants are free to act at times they would like whereas in discrete-trial 
procedures, the learning task is divided into trials and participant may only perform the action 
during this period.  In discrete-trial procedures, trials are separated by a time period known as 
the intertrial interval (ITI) of varying durations.  Experiments have tested people’s perception 
of control over outcomes using both kinds of paradigms (e.g., Allan & Jenkins, 1983; Alloy 
& Abramson, 1979; Byrom, Msetfi, & Murphy, 2015; Jenkins & Ward, 1965; Msetfi, 
Murphy, Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005; Msetfi, Murphy & Simpson, 2007; Msetfi, Wade & 
Murphy, 2013; Wasserman, Elek, Chatlosh, & Baker, 1993; Vázquez, 1987).  However, the 
advantage of discrete-trial procedures over free-operant procedures is that they include a 
clearly defined event structure with an objective measure of control with which judgements 
of control made by people can be compared to (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; Clark, Beck, 
& Alford, 1999; Dobson & Franche, 1989).  This is a measure of action-outcome 
contingency, denoted by the ΔP metric (Allan, 1980), which quantifies a statistical, one-way 
relation between binary events.   
The ΔP metric is simply equivalent to the difference between the probability of an 
outcome occurring in the presence of an action, P(O|A), and the probability of an outcome 
occurring in the absence of an action, P(O|~A). This metric can vary from  −1 (negative or 
preventative contingency) to 0 (zero contingency) to +1 (positive or generative contingency).  
For example, in a positive contingency schedule, outcomes are more likely to occur in the 
presence of action than in its absence, whereas in negative contingency schedule, outcomes 
are less likely to occur in the presence of action.  From this perspective, there are four 
possible action-outcome conjunctions relevant to contingency all of which are given equal 
weighting in the ΔP calculation, and are shown in Table 1 along with exemplar conditions. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
1.2. Outcome density effects and the context hypothesis  
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THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON JUDGEMENTS 5 
As can be seen in Table 1, in the zero contingency schedules, outcomes are equally likely to 
occur irrespective of the presence and absence of action.  However, most studies using 
discrete-trial operant contingency learning paradigms indicated that healthy individuals 
overestimate the degree of control they have over the outcomes when the outcome density 
(OD) or the probability of outcome to occur, P(O), is high, whereas people with mild 
depression tend to be less sensitive to such differences (see Moore & Fresco, 2012 for a 
meta-analysis). The effect that healthy people overestimate the degree of control in high OD 
condition is named OD bias or illusion of control, and is considered to be a deviation from 
∆P.  On the other hand, depressed people tend not to show this illusion, an effect known as 
depressive realism (Alloy & Abramson, 1979).  
 There are many behavioural- and cognitive-level explanations of OD and depressive 
realism effects, such as the response probability (Blanco, Matute, & Vadillo, 2012; Matute, 
1996), response criterion (Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel, 2008; Allan, Siegel, & Hannah, 
2007), and context hypotheses (Msetfi, Brosnan, & Cavus, 2016; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, 
& Kornbrot, 2005; Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007; Msetfi, Wade & Murphy, 2013).  It is 
not possible to review all these theories in detail here.  Briefly, however, Matute and 
colleagues suggested that illusory control might stem from high response probability, leading 
to more reinforced trials during the contingency learning task (Blanco, Matute, & Vadillo, 
2012; Matute, 1996).  On the other hand, in their psychophysical analysis of contingency, 
Allan and colleagues (Allan, Hannah, Crump, & Siegel, 2008; Allan, Siegel, & Hannah, 
2007) suggested that people perceive the normative ∆P within the constraints of memory and 
attention limits.  However, depressed people might have a lower response criterion (e.g., a 
tendency to say “nay”).  Given the centrally defining role of context in learning, we will 
particularly focus on contextual learning here.  
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Learning occurs in an environmental and associative context, and contextual effects 
have been studied and conceptualised in numerous ways in animal learning (e.g., Balsam & 
Tomie, 2014; Bouton & King, 1983; Estes, 1976; Maren, Phan, & Liberzon, 2013).  
Although environment represents a context, there are many other forms of contexts that 
define experience.  Our contingency manipulations here deal with action-outcome relations 
that occur in a particular context, and we study how individuals learn these relations .  
One of the simplest methods of testing context effects on learning is via temporal 
manipulations because context and time are interdependent (Msetfi, Wade, & Murphy, 2013).  
Along these lines, Msetfi and colleagues (2005; 2007) noted that most studies reporting OD 
effects involved long ITls.  To test the hypothesis that the ITI duration might influence 
judgements of control, Msetfi et al. (2005, 2007) varied ITI duration (3s vs. 15s), along with 
a standard OD manipulation (low vs. high) in two groups (depressed and non-depressed) in a 
zero contingency task.  Msetfi and colleagues’ findings indicated an OD effect in the non-
depressed group when ITIs were longer (e.g., 15s), and reduced OD effects in people with 
depressed mood in the same condition.  On the other hand, both non-depressed and depressed 
groups’ judgements of control did not significantly change due to OD manipulation when the 
ITIs were shorter (e.g., 3s).   
At the computational level, Msetfi et al. (2005) explained these findings in the light of 
their ITI integration hypothesis.  This hypothesis adjusts the experimental contingency by 
accounting for extra contextual information due to long ITIs.  When ITIs are integrated into 
the ΔP calculation as discrete events (cell ‘d’), this has the effect of decreasing P(O|~A), thus 
increasing ΔP in high OD conditions in particular (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 
2005; Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007). While non-depressed people’s judgements were 
consistent with the ITI integrated contingency, judgements of control made by people with 
mild depression seemed to be less sensitive to this information.  
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Msetfi and colleagues (2005) argued that the reason ITIs are relevant to the 
contingency, in spite of containing no actions or outcomes, is because they occur in the same 
context as all the other contingency events.  As depressed people’s judgements seem to be 
insensitive to ITI duration, possibly due to depression-related cognitive processes such as 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), the 
findings were consistent with the idea that impaired contextual learning might underlie 
depressive realism effect.  This hypothesis would also be compatible with the associative 
learning model (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), if ITIs are considered “context only” trials 
(e.g., no action-no outcome). This would result in a decrease in associative strength between 
context and outcome, leading the action to gain associative strength (Msetfi, Murphy, 
Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005).  
While it is possible that contextual learning is related to reduced OD effects in 
depression, the exact process of how contextual learning occurs (e.g., automatic vs. 
controlled) remains unknown.  Although, it is known that depressed people have a higher 
tendency to display self-referent and ruminative thinking (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008), which might be related to performance-related 
impairments in cognitive tasks (see Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012 for a review).  Based on this, we 
hypothesised that reduced cognitive capacity to integrate contextual information present 
during idle task periods (i.e, ITIs) will impact perceived control.  To test this hypothesis, we 
manipulated the level of cognitive load during the ITIs of an operant contingency learning 
task.  
 
1.3. The effects of working memory load on learning 
Working memory (WM) is the ability to maintain and manipulate limited information 
in short periods, and is thought to play an important role in complex cognition (Baddeley, 
1992, 1996; DeCaro, Thomas, & Beilock, 2008; Engle, 2002; Engle & Kane, 2004; Veltman, 
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Rombaust, & Dolan, 2003; however also see Tharp & Pickering, 2009).  It is believed that 
WM consists of different functions such as maintenance and manipulation of information.   
Previously, studies have tested the effects of WM load on rule-based and associative 
learning processes (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013; 
Waldron & Ashby, 2001; Wills, Barrasin, & McLaren, 2011; Wills, Graham, Koh, McLaren, 
& Rolland 2011).  For example, in two experiments, De Houwer and Beckers (2003) varied 
the cognitive load imposed by a concurrent task during a forward blocking version of a 
contingency learning task.  In this task, participants must learn that action A predicts outcome 
O.  Following this, participants were exposed to conditions where actions A and B 
simultaneously predicted O.  In such conditions, the strong association between A and O 
usually blocks the acquisition of the B-O relation (e.g., Kamin, 1969). However, De Houwer 
and Becker’s findings indicated that concurrent WM load led to higher ratings for the extent 
to which B was considered to be the cause of the outcome, compared to the no load 
condition.  In other words, the blocking effect was disrupted by high cognitive load, 
depending on secondary task difficulty and whether the load was imposed during both the 
learning and the test phase of the contingency learning task.  Given that the secondary task 
processing influenced forward blocking, De Houwer and Beckers explained that forward 
blocking seems to depend on higher-order cognition, rather than associative processes.  
Others have suggested that, under cognitive load, low-level associative processes such as 
cue-competition drive causal learning, similar to those in studies of animal conditioning (Le 
Pelley, Oakeshott, & McLaren, 2005).  Consistent with this, recent findings also show that 
the learning process affects cue-competition in evaluative contingency learning in humans 
(Kattner & Green, 2015).  
Relating these findings back to our central question, we might ask whether it is the 
use of different learning processes or a more general cognitive phenomenon that underlies the 
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OD and depressive realism effects in zero contingencies.  If learning of action-outcome 
relations is context-dependent, then reduced OD effects could be explained by limited 
capacity to process contextual information (limited capacity hypothesis), whereas available 
capacity would relate to “illusory” relations observed in operant contingency tasks with 
sufficiently long ITIs.  Therefore, we hypothesise that WM load during contextual learning 
periods of a contingency learning task will influence levels of perceived control and the size 
of OD effects in zero contingencies.  Specifically, we predict that high WM load will reduce 
the size of OD effects in non-depressed participants, whereas conditions with no WM load 
will produce sizeable OD effects, as seen in numerous other experiments.  We also 
hypothesised that action and context judgements would interact, as predicted by the 
associative learning model (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). 
 
2. Experiment 1 
In order to test our hypotheses, we used a dual task procedure, which incorporated a verbal 
WM component (Mason et al., 2007) into the ITIs of an operant contingency learning task.  
The contingency learning task included two rating scales (i.e., one for action and one for 
context).  Participants rated how much control action and context exerted upon outcomes in 
zero contingency conditions with low and high levels of OD. 
2.1. Method 
Ethical approval of this research was obtained from the University of Limerick Education and 
Health Sciences Faculty Research Ethics Committee (Approval code: EHSREC-1091). 
Before taking part, the participants provided written informed consent using a consent form 
approved by the research ethics committee.  The data have been reposted to Open Science 
Framework and are publicly available at osf.io/vjwzp. 
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THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON JUDGEMENTS 10  
2.1.1. Participants 
University students were invited via e-mail to take part in an experiment about mood changes 
and judgements.  Volunteers were entered into a prize draw with the possibility of winning a 
€100 voucher.  The inclusion criteria were to be over 18 years old and to have a score less 
than or equal to 8 in the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) at the time of test.  
Thirty-eight participants, who volunteered to take part, were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: no load and high load.1 Three participants failed to follow the contingency task 
instructions (two in no load and one in high load condition), resulting in a very high response 
probability (> .80), and one participant in the high load condition pressed the wrong key 
during the computer task disabling the computer to record the response rate and the 
experienced contingency.  These participants were therefore excluded from the analyses.  The 
final sample consisted of 34 participants (17 in the high load condition).  The mean age of the 
participants was 21.09 (SE= .51) and 25 of them were female (13 in the no load and 12 in the 
high load conditions).  The population means of the two load groups did not significantly 
differ on a range of relevant demographic and cognitive variables, including age, WM span 
scores (digit span forward), depression, anxiety, and stress levels, ts< 1.42 ps> .17. 
2.1.2. Design 
Experiment 1 involved a (2 × 2) × 2 fully factorial mixed design.  The two within-
subjects variables were OD (low vs. high) and Cue (action vs. context judgements).  The 
between-subjects variable was WM load (no load vs. high load).  Dependent variables were 
                                                 1 This sample size was predetermined based on a power analysis for within-subjects effect in 
order to attain a power of .80 and medium effect size (f= .25).  A small margin of error was 
also included, as rarely participants do not follow the task instructions during discrete-trial 
operant contingency learning tasks, resulting in a very low or high response probability and 
deviations from the pre-programmed contingencies.  Our sample size was sufficient for the 
hypothesised within-between interactions, while we did not have power to test between 
subject effects. 
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action and context ratings.  In each group, participants were exposed to both low and high 
OD zero contingency conditions in two virtual rooms, respectively.  The OD order was 
counterbalanced with approximately half of the participants completing the task in Low-High 
order. 
 
2.1.3. Materials 
Pre-test measures.  WM span was measured using the forward version of the digit span task 
(Lezak, 1995).  We used the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, & Mendelson, 
1961) to measure depressed mood.  In addition to the BDI, we also used the shorter version 
of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) to 
measure depression, anxiety, and stress-related symptoms. 
The dual contingency and WM load task.  The dual task superimposed a verbal WM task 
(Mason et al., 2007) over the ITIs of the contingency learning task (Msetfi, Wade, & 
Murphy, 2013).  In the contingency learning task, participants were given a cover story in 
which they were asked to test whether an audio system in a residence was working properly.  
They could control the music switching on in each of the rooms in the residence (i.e., distinct 
room representations) using a virtual remote control.  However, participants were told that 
the remote control had been working intermittently, and that sometimes music switches on 
when no one is touching the remote control.  The task was therefore to test the remote control 
in each of the rooms separately.  Participants were asked to press the space bar on 
approximately half of the opportunities and observe whether an outcome occurred (i.e., 
2000ms music clip play) in 80 experimental trials (40 in each OD condition, hence in each 
virtual room).  Action was signalled by a short beep sound and an on-screen prompt (i.e., 
“You may press the button now!”) that appeared on the screen for 3000ms in every trial.  
These signals indicated the contingency task trials, similar to the yellow light in Alloy and 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE LOAD ON JUDGEMENTS 12 
Abramson’s (1979) discrete-trial procedure.  During this time, participants could press the 
space bar.  Each experimental trial was separated by a 5000ms ITI.  This duration was chosen 
to accommodate the trials of the WM component.  Trials and the ITIs occurred in the same 
virtual context in each OD condition.  Each OD condition occurred in a virtual context 
represented by two room pictures (each decorated differently) on the computer screen.  The 
contingency task consisted of two conditions (low OD and high OD) with different levels of 
outcomes (see Table 1, zero contingency for the pre-programmed contingencies).  In each 
OD condition, the outcome schedules were randomised in blocks of every four trials.  
Participants were asked how much control they or the context had upon the outcome in the 
middle and at the end of each condition using two scales displayed on the computer screen 
(one for action and one for context).2  These scales were constructed with increments of +/ −1 
and ranged from −100 (totally prevent) to 100 (totally control).  The rating scales were 
presented on the same window simultaneously, and the exact wording for the action and 
context rating scales is provided in Appendix A.  
 
The WM component of the dual task was adapted from Mason and colleagues’ verbal 
WM task (Mason et al., 2007), and was only presented during the ITIs of the contingency 
task in a white box on the top part of the screen.  As the introduction of a secondary task 
materials during the ITI makes the ITI context differ from the trial context which could 
potentially influence the contextual learning process, we chose to present the WM component 
in both high and no load groups, without giving the latter the instructions to complete it.  
Thus the two groups were presented exactly the same visual stimuli during the contingency 
                                                 2 Action and context ratings were taken twice: once after the 20th trial (middle judgement 
window), and the other at the end (final judgement window). We analysed this by entering 
time of judgements as a within-subjects variable. Because, time of judgements did not 
significantly interact with OD, cue, and WM load in both experiments (Fs< 1), we chose to 
report the analyses conducted with the final judgements. 
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task trials as well as the ITIs.  The WM task involved remembering and manipulating four-
letter strings (e.g., “SRJN”).  In this modified version, each task trial (the ITI) began with a 
fixation cross (1000ms), displayed in the white box, and followed by a four-letter string 
(1000ms).  An arrow pointing backward or forward then followed the letter strings (1000ms) 
indicating the direction of the retrieval.  The letter to be retrieved was indicated by a number 
(e.g., 2) after the arrow and stayed on the screen for 2000ms.  For example, when the arrow 
was backward and the number was 2, the correct answer for the “SRJN” letter string would 
be “J”.  However, when the arrow was forward, the correct answer would be “R” for the 
same string.  In each trial of the WM task, the letter string, the direction of the arrow, and the 
number were pseudo-randomly determined.  In contrast to the original task, participants were 
instructed to give their responses verbally right after they saw the number rather than 
pressing a key, since key press could lead to motor interference with the responses given for 
the contingency task.  We also did not provide online feedback to the participants about their 
performance in the WM component, as this could increase the stress levels experienced in the 
high load group.  Participants were also instructed to give their responses until they heard a 
short beep sound as this signalled the end of the ITI and the beginning of the contingency 
trial.  These responses were audio recorded and analysed by the experimenter.   
Across the two experiments reported here retrieving the correct letter was more 
difficult for the backward trials than the forward trials, see Table 2.  This was confirmed by a 
2 × 2 repeated measures analysis, where the within-subjects factor was retrieval direction 
(backward vs. forward) and the between subjects factor was experiment.  The findings 
indicated a significant main effect of retrieval direction, F(1, 32)= 20.429, p<.001, ηp2= .39, 
CI.90 for ηp2 [.166, .544]. The interaction between retrieval direction and experiment was not 
significant, F(1, 32)= 1.649, p= .209, ηp2= .05, CI.90 for ηp2 [0, .202]. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
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Apparatus.  Experimental materials were programmed in REALbasic (2009, Release 2.1) 
software, and presented on Macintosh computers (iMac, 17” screen size).  Audacity (2013, 
Release 2.0.5) software was used to record verbal responses given during the dual task.  
2.1.4. Procedure 
Participants were recruited via e-mail to volunteer in a study about mood changes and 
judgements.  Upon reading the information sheet and signing the informed consent form, 
participants completed all the pre-test measures.  Then, they were randomly assigned to either 
one of the experimental conditions (no load or high load) in order to complete the 
contingency task.  First, participants read the instructions for the contingency task (see 
Appendix B for the task instructions).  In order to make sure that they understood the task 
instructions, participants were verbally reminded to press the space bar on the keyboard on 
approximately half of trials, and were given more explanation if they had any questions.  In 
the high load condition, participants were instructed to complete the WM component as 
instructed.  In the no load condition, participants were informed that the WM task stimuli 
were not relevant for the purposes of the experiment, and were not given the instructions to 
complete it.  The experimenter then left the individual experimental cubicle and the 
participants started the task.  
The contingency task took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  In the middle and 
at the end of each game, a judgement window appeared and participants were asked to rate 
how much control their action or the context exerted upon the music.  At the end of the 
experiment, participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
Visual inspection of the results suggested that participants in the no load condition 
displayed OD effects for the action judgements (i.e., higher judgements in high OD 
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condition), whereas high load participants did not (see Figure 1).  These observations were 
tested using parametric tests with an alpha level maintained at .05 unless stated otherwise. 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 Judgement of control data were analysed using (2 × 2) × 2 mixed analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).  The between-subjects variable was group (high load, no load), and the two 
within-subjects variables were OD (low, high) and cue (action, context).  The results showed 
a significant main effect of OD, F(1, 32)= 9.70, p= .004, ηp2= .23, CI.90 for ηp2 [.049, .409], 
and a significant three-way interaction between OD, cue, and WM load, F(1, 32)= 4.39, p= 
.044, ηp2= .12, CI.90 for ηp2 [.002, .296]. None of the other effects were significant (Table 3). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 In order to understand the three-way interaction, we analysed the action and context 
judgements separately.  There was a reliable OD and WM load interaction for the action 
judgements, F(1, 32)= 10.01, p= .003, ηp2= .24, CI.90 for ηp2 [.052, .415]. The main effect of 
OD was marginally significant for context judgements, F(1, 32)= 3.41, p= .074, ηp2= .10, 
CI.90 for ηp2 [0, .267], and the OD and WM load interaction was not significant for the context 
judgements, F<1.  We then conducted pairwise comparison analyses for action and context 
ratings of each load group in two different OD conditions.  The results showed that ratings of 
control in Low versus High OD conditions differed significantly for action judgements in the 
no load group, p< .001 whereas this effect was not reliable in the high load group, p=.719.. 
As expected, the ratings of control in Low versus High OD conditions did not significantly 
differ for context ratings in both load groups, p>.07.  Thus, WM load reduced the OD effect 
for action ratings in the high load group.  
We looked at whether the two load groups had experienced different levels of 
experienced contingency (∆PEXP), response probabilities, and reaction times due to WM load.  
In both groups, mean ∆PEXP approximated zero (see Table 4), F<1, and the overall response 
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probabilities were similar, (M = .61, SE= .04, in the no load group, and M = .61, SE= .03, in 
the high load group), F< 1.  
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
We also analysed whether there were differences in RTs to the key press trials of the 
contingency learning task due to load.  Participants in the high load condition made slower 
responses (M= 1144ms, SE= 48ms) on the contingency task trials compared to the 
participants in the no load condition (M= 1011ms, SE= 51ms).  However, this difference was 
marginally significant, F(1, 30)= 3.66,, p= .065, ηp2= .11, CI.90 for ηp2 [0, .275]. 
In Experiment 1, we tested whether WM load during ITIs influenced judgements of 
control in an operant contingency learning task with zero contingencies.  The findings 
showed that under high WM load, the OD effect for action judgements was eliminated.  
There were no significant load effects on context ratings.  While these findings are consistent 
with the limited capacity hypothesis that WM load during the ITIs impacts contextual 
learning during contingency learning and eliminates OD effects, there is another possible and 
simple explanation.  These findings might be related to increased task difficulty due to the 
dual task procedure and lack of OD effects in the high load group simply represents an 
inability to do contingency learning under these conditions.  Namely, participants in the high 
load condition might simply rated no control due to completing a difficult task that prevented 
them learning contingencies.  
3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested the possibility that WM load might interfere with 
contingency learning in general as opposed to OD effects specifically.  One way of testing 
this is to compare the effects of WM load under different contingency conditions (i.e., zero 
vs. positive) as well as levels of OD.  Thus if participants’ judgements under high WM load 
reflect discrimination between different levels of contingency in a within-subjects design 
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with reduced or eliminated OD effects, this indicates that they can learn the difference 
between those statistical relations and that the WM effect is specific to the OD effect.  If on 
the other hand, high WM participants neither discriminate between zero and positive 
contingencies nor show OD effects, this would suggest that WM load affects the ability to 
learn contingencies in general, other than contextual information as we hypothesised.  
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we used both zero and positive contingencies to 
investigate whether WM load during the ITIs influence contingency learning proper.  It was 
hypothesised that contingency will influence perceived control levels in both no load and 
high load groups, whereas high WM load will reduce OD effects for action judgements.  
Similar to Experiment 1, we hypothesised an interaction between action and context ratings, 
particularly in zero contingency condition. 
3.1. Method 
Details of Experiment 2 are identical to Experiment 1, and only pertinent details will be 
included here. 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
Volunteers were given €5 or course credits for participation.  Thirty-six participants were 
assigned to the no load and high load groups.  Two participants (one in high load group) 
failed to follow the contingency task instructions, resulting in high response probability (> 
.80) and were therefore excluded from the analyses.  The final sample consisted of 34 
participants (17 in the high load condition).  The mean age of the participants was 24.23 
(SE=1.17).  Twenty of the participants were female (9 in the no load and 11 in the high load 
condition).  The population means of the two load groups did not significantly differ on a 
range of relevant demographic and cognitive variables, including as age, WM span (digit 
span forward), depression, anxiety, and stress levels, ts< 1.06, ps> .29.  
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3.1.2. Design 
Experiment 2 involved a (2 × 2 × 2) × 2 fully factorial mixed design.  The three within-
subjects factors were OD (Low vs. High), cue (Action vs. Context), and contingency (zero vs. 
positive) and the between-subjects factor was WM load (no load vs. high load).  We also 
controlled for the contingency order (zero first vs. positive first) in the analyses (Marsh & 
Ahn, 2006).  The same task instructions were used as of Experiment 1.  In each group, 
participants were exposed to zero and positive contingencies with low and high OD levels 
resulting in four conditions (i.e., Zero contingency-Low OD and High OD, Positive 
contingency-Low OD and High OD).  Each condition took place in a unique virtual room.  
The task order was counterbalanced using combinations of the four conditions. 
 
3.1.3. Materials and Procedure 
 Details are the same as Experiment 1, except that in the positive contingency 
conditions participants were exposed to ∆P= .50, low and high OD schedules [P(O)= .25 and 
.75, see Msetfi, Murphy, & Simpson, 2007 for the pre-programmed contingencies, assuming 
a response probability of .5).  
 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
Participants judged zero and positive contingencies with low and high levels of OD.  Visual 
inspection of the results revealed that two groups were able to discriminate zero and positive 
contingencies but that WM load appeared to have reduced the size OD effect on action 
judgements (Figure 2).  
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 The results showed a significant main effects of OD, F(1, 30)= 30.96, p< .001, ηp2= 
.51, CI.90 for ηp2 [.265, .626], contingency,  F(1, 30)= 12.79, p= .001, ηp2= .30, CI.90 for ηp2 
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[.082, .458], and cue, F(1, 30)= 5.27, p= .029, ηp2= .15, CI.90 for ηp2 [.008, .319]. There was a 
significant two-way interaction between cue and contingency, F(1, 30)= 13.89, p< .001, ηp2= 
.32, CI.90 for ηp2 [.094, .473], and a significant three-way interaction between OD, cue, and 
WM load, F(1, 30)= 4.44, p= .044, ηp2= .13, CI.90 for ηp2 [.002, .297].  None of the other 
effects were significant (Table 4). 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
We then carried out simple effects analyses in order to understand the interaction 
terms.  The findings showed a significant effect of contingency for action judgements, F(1, 
30)= 30.51, p< .001, ηp2= .50, CI.90 for ηp2 [.261, .623], but not for context judgements, F<1. 
This means that as we expected the participants’ action judgements reflected different levels 
of contingencies tested.  In terms of the three-way interaction between OD, cue, and WM 
load, the findings showed significant OD effects for action and context judgements in the no 
load group, F(1, 30)= 16.92, p<.001, ηp2= .36, CI.90 for ηp2[.127, .510], and F(1, 30)= 7.28, p= 
.011, ηp2= .20, CI.90 for ηp2 [.205, .365], respectively.  There was a significant OD effect on 
context judgements in the high load group, F(1, 30)= 15.80, p= .001, ηp2= .35, CI.90 for ηp2 
[.115, .497] but not on action judgements, F(1, 30)= 2.25,  p= .146, ηp2= .07, CI.90 for ηp2 [0, 
.227]. In sum, OD effects were significantly reduced for action ratings in the high load 
condition as compared to the no load condition. 
As in Experiment 1, we analysed whether two groups experienced different levels of 
∆PEXP, response probabilities, and RTs to the contingency task due to WM load.  In both 
groups, the mean ∆PEXP approximated the pre-programmed contingencies in zero and 
positive contingency conditions (see Table 4).  We carried out a repeated measures analysis 
to control whether there was a difference in experienced contingencies.  The within-groups 
factor was contingency (zero vs. positive), and the between groups factor was condition (no 
load vs. high load).  There was a significant main effect of contingency manipulation on 
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experienced contingencies, F(1, 32)= 196.464,  p= <.001, ηp2= .95, CI.90 for ηp2 [.759, .897], 
but not a significant interaction between contingency and condition, F< 1. Overall response 
probabilities were similar between the load groups, (Ms = .54, SEs= .02), F< 1.  We also 
analysed whether there were differences in RTs to the key press trials of the contingency 
learning task.  Average RTs of both groups were within the allowed interval (i.e., <3000ms).  
Participants in the high load condition had slower RTs (M= 1188ms, SE= 55ms) to the task 
trials compared to the participants in the no load condition (M= 925ms, SE= 61ms), F(1, 29)= 
10.22, p= .003, ηp2= .26, CI.90 for ηp2 [.055, .418]. 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether WM load during the ITIs influenced OD effects 
and contingency sensitivity.  The findings showed that WM load did not influence 
contingency sensitivity, such that participants under high WM load could still discriminate 
between zero and positive contingency conditions.  This confirms that the WM load effect is 
not simply due to task difficulty.  Similar to the findings of Experiment 1, the OD effect was 
reduced in zero and positive contingency conditions.  
4. General discussion 
In two experiments, we tested whether available WM capacity during the ITIs of an operant 
contingency learning task plays an important role in OD effects and perception of control.  
Our findings have shown that OD effects were reduced under cognitive load during the ITIs 
(Experiment 1 and 2), and yet the participants’ ratings of control were still sensitive to 
different levels of contingencies (Experiment 2).  Thus, the findings reported here support the 
hypothesis that increasing WM load during contingency learning results in reduced OD 
effects.  We had also hypothesised that high WM load during ITIs would use up limited 
cognitive capacity and impact contextual learning.  It was this mechanism, we reasoned, that 
would cause the reduction in the size of OD effects.  The participants’ action ratings were 
consistent with these predictions.  For example, WM load effects on action ratings were 
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expected to be the most prominent in the high OD conditions.  The results from Experiment 1 
and 2 were consistent with this prediction such that action ratings mostly differed in high OD 
conditions.  Generally, these findings are consistent with previous work suggesting that OD 
effects on contingency learning is influenced by learning of contextual information present 
during ITIs (e.g., Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005), and provide important 
insights into puzzling phenomena, such as illusory control and depressive realism effects 
(e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005), which might 
be influenced by available cognitive resources to process contextual information.  In the 
remainder of our discussion, we will first focus on the OD effects on action and context 
ratings and associative learning theory explanations for these effects, and then the limitations 
of our study as well as future directions. 
 Human judgements of control systematically deviate from ∆P when OD is 
manipulated (Allan & Jenkins, 1983).  These deviations observed in human contingency 
learning can be simulated by a non-normative account, in which one treats the contingency 
events unequally salient and associable (e.g., Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Shanks, 
1985; Shanks, Lopez, Darby, & Dickinson, 1996; Wasserman et al., 1993).  For example, 
when absence of the outcome is considered to be more salient than its presence, the 
associative learning model (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) can predict OD effects (Shanks, 
Lopez, Darby, & Dickinson, 1996).  However, one could also explain deviations on the 
grounds of cue-competition while maintaining normative assumptions.  For example, Msetfi 
et al.’s (2005) simulations show that when ITIs are considered no action-no outcome trials, 
the Rescorla-Wagner model can account for OD effects without any parameter manipulation. 
Associative learning theory assumes that associations develop between cues (action 
and context) and outcomes after repeated pairings.  The Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla & 
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Wagner, 1972) is an exemplar model of associative learning that has frequently been applied 
to human operant contingency learning (Blanco & Matute, 2014; Dickinson, Shanks, & 
Evenden, 1984; Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005). In this model, an error 
correction algorithm governs the change in associative strength on any given trial 
∆V= αβ(λ − ∑V) [1] 
In Equation 1, ∆V represents the trial-by-trial change in predictive strength, α represents 
salience of cue, β represents outcome associability, and λ represents the maximum associative 
strength that can be carried by the model, with a value of 1 for outcome occurrence and 0 for 
outcome non-occurrence.  The Rescorla-Wagner model can treat context as a discrete cue 
that can enter into associative relations with the outcome, and, due to summation of the 
associative strength of all cues present during a trial (e.g., ∑V= VAction + VContext), the model 
predicts competition between action and context in the acquisition and extinction of 
associations with the outcome  (i.e., cue-competition).  This leads the associative strength for 
action to converge with ∆P at the end of learning (Chapman & Robbins, 1990).  Hence, the 
Rescorla-Wagner model does not predict OD effects for action asymptotically (however, see 
Allan, 1993 for pre-asymptotic OD effects the model predicts).   
On the other hand, the Rescorla-Wagner model always predicts OD effects for 
context-outcome associations at the end of learning (see Allan, 1993 and Msetfi, Murphy, 
Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005 for simulations).  Consistent with these prediction and previous 
findings (e.g., Byrom, Msetfi, & Murphy, 2015; Chase et al., 2011; Reed, 2015; Msetfi, 
Brosnan, & Cavus, 2016), here we found a significant OD effect on context ratings in 
Experiment 2, as well as in the combined data set (Experiment 1 and 2), F (1, 64)= 16.337, 
p<.001 , ηp2= .20 ,CI.90 for ηp2 [.071, .329], although this effect was not significant in 
Experiment 1, possibly due to low statistical power.  However, if context-outcome 
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associations are somewhat decreased due to additional context-no outcome information (i.e., 
cell ‘d’) occurring during the ITIs, the action can gain additional associative strength 
particularly when OD is high (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson & Kornbrot, 2005).  We could hence 
speculate that high WM load during the ITIs might have interfered with the ability of the 
action-outcome association to gain additional associative strength.  While it might not be 
straightforward to map judgements of control onto associative strength, the Pearson’s 
correlations between action and context ratings in our data set resembled asymptotic 
predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner model in terms of the relation between action and context 
ratings (Table 6).  That is, in the no load condition action and context ratings were positively 
and significantly correlated in zero contingency high OD condition, suggesting that cue-
competition was either absent or incomplete (see Byrom, Msetfi, & Murphy, 2015 and Reid, 
2015 for similar findings).  On the other hand, in the high load condition action and context 
ratings were negatively correlated, albeit non-significantly.  It should be noted that findings 
from previous animal learning research have also suggested that cue-competition might not 
always occur to the same degree that the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts (e.g., Rescorla, 
2000), and whether available cognitive resources impact cue-competition and human 
contingency learning remains to be investigated in future research more comprehensively. 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
4.1. Limitations and future directions 
A possibility we also addressed was that WM load might have influenced OD effects 
by eliminating people's ability to learn about contingencies in general, due to increased task 
difficulty.  However, we excluded this possibility as Experiment 2 clearly showed that 
participants were sensitive to different levels of contingency under WM load.  This suggests 
that reduced OD effects in the high load condition were not due to impaired learning of 
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contingencies in general.  Another possibility we should acknowledge is that due to increased 
cognitive load specific to the ITIs, these periods may actually constitute a unique context in 
the high WM load condition and this does not necessarily affect the action-outcome 
contingency, which occurs in a different context (e.g., without increased cognitive load). 
Similarly, one could argue that increased WM load during the idle task periods represent 
unique internal ‘coding responses’ (Estes, 1976).  However, any additional cues (context with 
load or internal coding) would be predicted to dilute the associative strength available to the 
original context, thus increasing the strength of the action (see arguments presented by 
Shanks, 1989 and Hammond & Weinberg, 1984), which is not the case in the present study.  
On the other hand, increased WM load might impact selective attention to contextual 
information present during the ITIs (Msetfi, Brosnan, & Cavus, 2016), which seems to be a 
more likely explanation for the current findings.  One further limitation of our study is that 
we did not manipulate the temporal location of WM load.  Thus, we cannot fully rule out 
whether the effects were specific to increased cognitive load during the ITIs or in general.   
Whilst acknowledging these limitations, we note that our WM manipulation did not 
interfere with the overall response probability or experienced contingency, thus ruling out 
these factors as potential explanations to the current findings.  However, the findings from 
both experiments did indicate that the WM load resulted in slowed down responses within the 
allowed interval.  Slowed down responses in a discrete trial procedure actually produce 
greater contiguity between action and outcome and might be predicted to produce increased 
judgements of control in a free-operant task (e.g., Shanks, Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989).  On 
the contrary, participants in the high load group perceived less control in our study.  It should 
be noted that in our study the average RT difference between the no load and high load 
groups was small (< 200ms).  Moreover, evidence elsewhere also suggests that ITI effects are 
not induced by changes in the temporal contiguity between action and outcome in discrete-
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trial operant contingency learning tasks (Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson, & Kornbrot, 2005).  
Thus, taken together, the current findings support the hypothesis that high load compromised 
the cognitive resources allocated to learning of contextual relations during the idle task 
periods (i.e., ITIs). 
5. Conclusions 
It has been suggested that low expectations of control might be related to accurate 
judgements of control, while apparent illusions of control due to OD bias in zero contingency 
situations have been related to optimism and inaccuracy in people who are non-depressed 
(Alloy & Abramson, 1988).  Similar to previous work (e.g., Msetfi, Murphy, Simpson & 
Kornbrot, 2005; Msetfi, Wade, & Murphy, 2013), the evidence from this work suggests that 
available cognitive resources to process contextual information within idle task periods 
between the trials might result in overestimated levels of perceived control in high OD 
conditions.  On the other hand, limited cognitive capacity to incorporate additional contextual 
information during these periods might relate to decreased levels of perceived control.  These 
findings might have implications for the contextual learning process in healthy as well as 
depressed individuals.  For example, there may be consequences to information overload, say 
from social media and frequent electronic alerts and communications (e.g., Himma, 2007), as 
well as cognitive ergonomics that are so far unanticipated in terms of consequences to 
cognitive capacity.  Our findings also have implications for understanding the psychological 
consequences of therapeutic approaches to depression, which involve cognitive training, such 
as cognitive remediation therapy (e.g., Bowie, Gupta, & Holshausen, 2013).  
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Table 1 
The standard 2 × 2 operant contingency table and zero contingency high and low outcome 
density conditions, assuming a response rate of .5. 
 Outcome P(O|A) P(O|~A) P(O) ΔP 
Action Present (O) Absent (~O)  
 Generic information     
Present (A) a b a / (a + 
b) 
c / (c + d) (a + c) / N a / (a + b) 
− c / (c + 
d) 
Absent  
(~A) 
c d   
 High OD zero contingency     
Present (A) 15 5 .75 .75 .75 0 
Absent  
(~A) 
15 5   
 Low OD zero contingency     
Present (A) 5 15 .25 .25 .25 0 
Absent  
(~A) 
5 15   
 
Notes.  The letters in the cells (a, b, c, and d) represent the frequency of co-occurrences and 
non-co-occurrences of an Action (A) and an Outcome (O). Contingency= ΔP= P(O|A) − 
P(O|~A).  Outcome density (OD) is the probability of outcome to occur and is calculated as 
P(O)= (a + c) / N, where N is the total number of the events.   
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Table 2 
Mean percentage of incorrect responses to the Working Memory component 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Forward 10.26 (3.50) 11.70 (1.58) 
Backward 29.57 (5.75) 22.46 (4.67) 
Note.  Standard errors of the mean are given in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for the Judgements of Control Data in Experiment 1 
 
Source F p ηp2 CIs around ηp2 
[Lower bound, 
Upper bound] 
OD 9.696 .004 .233 [.049, .409] 
OD × WM load .853 .363 .026 [0, .162] 
Cue .075 .786 .002 [0, .08] 
Cue × WM load .243 .626 .008 [0, .113] 
OD × Cue .089 .767 .003 [0, .085] 
OD × Cue × 
WM load 
4.390 .044 .121 [.002, .295] 
Notes. dfs= 1, OD= Outcome density, WM= Working memory 
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Table 4 
Mean experienced contingencies and response rates in Experiment 1 and 2 
 Experienced contingency (∆PEXP) Response rates 
 No WM load High WM load No WM load High WM load 
 Range Mean 
(SE) 
Range Mean 
(SE) 
Range Mean 
(SE) 
Range Mean 
(SE) 
Experiment 1         
Low OD (zero 
contingency) 
−.32-
.22 
.02 
(.04) 
−.28-
.38 
.05 
(.04) 
.45-
.80 
.60 
(.03) 
.48- 
.75 
.62 
(.02) 
High OD (zero 
contingency) 
−.27-
.29 
.02 
(.04) 
−.25-
.29 
−.01 
(.04) 
.48-
.68 
.55 
(.02) 
.35- 
.68 
.53 
(.02) 
Experiment 2         
Low OD (zero 
contingency) 
−.30-
.33 
.02 
(.05) 
−.18-
.48 
.03 
(.04) 
.40-
.78 
.56 
(.02) 
.38-
.78 
.58 
(.03) 
High OD (zero 
contingency) 
−.25-
.17 
.02 
(.03) 
−.23-
.29 
.03 
(.03) 
.35-
.70 
.52 
(.02) 
.20-
.70 
.51 
(.03) 
Low OD (positive 
contingency) 
.38-
.80 
.56 
(.02) 
.35-
.81 
.56 
(.03) 
.35-
.78 
.59 
(.03) 
.38-
.75 
.59 
(.03) 
High OD (positive 
contingency) 
.35-
.86 
.52 
(.04) 
.29-
.68 
.49 
(.03) 
.43-
.60 
.51 
(.01) 
.33-
.63 
.49 
(.02) 
Note. OD= Outcome density, SE= Standard error of the mean 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance for the Judgements of Control Data in Experiment 2 
 
Source F p ηp2 CIs around ηp2 
[Lower bound, 
Upper bound] 
OD 30.962 < .001 .508 [.268, .625] 
OD × WM load .080 .779 .003 [0, .082] 
Cue 5.266 .029 .149 [.008, .318] 
Cue × WM load  2.237 .145 .069 [0, .227] 
Contingency 12.788 .001 .299 [.082, .457] 
Contingency × 
WM load 
.048 .828 .002 [0, .068] 
Cue × 
Contingency 
13.887 .001 .316 [.094, .472] 
Cue × 
Contingency × 
WM load 
.036 .852 .001 [0, .061] 
Cue × OD 2.463 .127 .076 [0, .235] 
Cue × OD × 
WM load 
4.440 .044 .129 [.002, .297] 
Contingency × 
OD 
.246 .623 .008 [0, .114] 
Contingency × 
OD × WM load 
.098 .756 .003 [0, .087] 
Cue × 
Contingency × 
OD 
.821 .372 .027 [0, .161] 
Cue × 
Contingency × 
OD × WM load 
.847 .365 .027 [0, .162] 
Notes. dfs= 1, OD= Outcome density, WM= Working memory 
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Table 6 
Pearson’s correlations between action and context ratings in zero and positive contingency 
high and no Working Memory load conditions, with low and high outcome density  
 No WM load High WM load 
 Low OD High OD Low OD High OD 
Zero contingency 
(N=68)  
.34* .43* .29 .23 
Positive contingency 
(N=34) 
.20 .31 .15 .42 
Notes. *p< .05, OD= Outcome density, WM= Working memory 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1.  Mean judgements of action (Act) and context (Cxt) control in low and high OD 
conditions for the no load (on the left side) and the high load (on the right side) groups in 
zero contingency. Outcome density is the probability of music playing in each room.  The 
outer tier of the error bars depicts a 95% CI for individual mean, while the inner tier is a 
difference-adjusted Cousineau–Morey interval (Baguley, 2012). 
Figure 2.  Mean judgements of action (Act) and context (Cxt) control in low and high 
outcome density conditions for the no load (on the left side) and the high load (on the right 
side) groups in zero (Zero) and positive (Pos) contingencies.  For the error bars, see the 
previous figure.  
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Appendix A 
Wording for the judgements of control scales 
We would now like you to make some judgements about how much control there was over 
the music switching on in this particular room.  You can make these judgements by using the 
slider below.  
 
If you think that, when you press the button, you have total control over the music coming 
on, move the slider to the totally control end.  If you think that by pressing the button you 
totally prevent or interfere with the music switching on, move the slider to the totally prevent 
end. Or you might think that your button pressing has no influence over the music coming on, 
then put the slider in the middle.  Putting the slider nearer to the totally control end means 
MORE control, while putting it nearer to the totally prevent end means that your pressing the 
button interferes or prevents the music from switching on to some degree.  
 
SLIDER APPEARS HERE (−100 totally prevent to 100 totally control)  
 
To what extent do you think that the music switched on in THIS PARTICULAR room, 
irrespective of whether you pressed the remote control button or not?  If something about this 
particular room seemed to control the music switching on, move the slider nearer to the 
totally control end. If something about this particular room seemed to prevent the music from 
switching on, move the slider nearer to the totally prevent end. Put the slider in the middle if 
whether you were in this particular room or not made no difference to the music switching 
on. Make your judgements on the slider shown below: 
 
SLIDER APPEARS HERE (−100 totally prevent to 100 totally control) 
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Appendix B 
Dual task instructions 
 
In this task, you will be taken into several different rooms in a house.  The rooms will 
look similar to the one shown below: 
ROOM PICTURE APPEARS HERE 
All of the rooms contain hidden speakers, which are connected to the house stereo 
system.  A small remote control is available, in order to allow the residents of the house to 
listen to music in whichever room they are in.  The remote control has a button, which can be 
used to switch the music on.  You will see the remote control on the screen when you are 
taken into the rooms.  You should be able to control the music switching on in the rooms by 
pressing the music button using the space-bar key on the keyboard.  However, the residents 
of the house think that there may be a problem with the wiring of the stereo system in the 
rooms and your task here is to test whether you can control the music switching on in each of 
the rooms in the house.  In order to do this, you will have to test the remote control in each of 
the rooms.  We have put a short music clip on the CD in the stereo, which you can try to play 
using the remote control.  When the test starts, you will be taken to the first room and you 
should wait until you hear a beep sound and an on-screen message tells you that you are 
allowed to press the music button.  You will be allowed to press and test the button in that 
room on numerous occasions before deciding whether you can control the music switching 
on.  However, you are only allowed to press the button after you hear the beep sound and 
when you see the onscreen message.  When you have finished testing the remote control in 
one room, you will be taken to the next room to start the next test. When you are allowed to 
press the button in one of the rooms, the remote control will look like the one shown below, 
and you will be able to press it using the SPACEBAR key on the computer keyboard. 
REMOTE CONTROL PICTURE APPEARS HERE 
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When you have pressed the button, the music will either switch on for a short period 
of time or it will remain off.  You must then wait for your next opportunity to press one of the 
buttons.  Some of the residents of the house have reported that the music sometimes switches 
on when no one is using the remote control.  So in order to conduct the test properly, on 
approximately half of the occasions when you are told that you can press the button, you 
should NOT PRESS it and see what happens.  While you are doing this task a cross (+), 
random letters, arrows and numbers will appear in the white box on top of the screen.  These 
items are not relevant for the purposes of this experiment.  You can simply ignore them and 
concentrate on the music task.  About half way through your test in each room, the test will 
stop and you will be asked to make a judgement about how much control you had over the 
music switching on in that room.  Once you have made that judgement, you will return to the 
same room and continue the test.  Once all of your opportunities to test the button in that 
room have been used, you will be asked to make your final judgement about how much 
control you had over the music switching on in that room.  When you have done that, you 
will see a message prompting to start your test in the next room when you are ready.  If you 
have any questions, please ask the experimenter now.  
 
Additional instructions in the high load condition: While you are doing this task, an extra 
task will appear in the white box on top of the screen.  In this box, you will see a little cross 
(+) appear followed by a 4-letter string (e.g., XHKY).  You are required to keep that string in 
mind, as you will be asked to remember one of the letters in that string shortly.  You will then 
see an arrow (either forward or backwards), and a number will follow indicating which letter 
in that particular string is asked for you to remember.  On the next screen, you will see some 
examples. Here are some examples: 
XHKY 
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When the arrow is forward (--->) and the following number is 3, you are required to 
remember the third letter in a forward direction.  For the above example, the correct answer 
would be the letter K.  When the arrow is backwards (<---), and the following number is 3, 
you are required to remember the third letter in a backward direction.  For the above 
example, the correct answer would be the letter H.  You need to say your answer out loud as 
soon as you see the number on the screen.  Please try to remember the letter correctly as 
possible.  However, if you cannot remember it, don't worry, you may choose not to give an 
answer for that particular trial.  After that you will hear the beep sound.  After that point DO 
NOT try to remember the letter or give an answer.  This is an opportunity to concentrate on 
the music task until the fixation cross reappears in the white box. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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